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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
trespass-an intrusion into the premises without the consent of the owner.
State v. Mesh (1907), 36 Mont. 168, 92 Pac. 459; see also People v. Kelly
(1916), 274 fI1. 556, 113 N. E. 926; State v. Moore (1841), 12 N. H. 42;
State v. Newbegin (1846), 25 Me. 502, has been cited in support of the
contrary view. It should be noted, however, that the Maine statute re-
quires both a breaking and entry to constitute burglary.
The intention of the legislatures in defining the offense of burglary was
to abolish the technical distinctions between acts that do not differ essentially
in point of criminality. It seems that the decision in State v. Bull is in
line with this development. E. S., '31.
Cs-Lms-UmrrY oN FoRGED BILL OF LADING ISSUED BY AGENT.-An
employee of a railway company went to a bank in a different state from
that in which he worked and under an assumed name forged a draft on
plaintiff cotton company and a bill of lading calling for 110 bales of cot-
ton. No cotton was ever delivered for shipment. The employee, in his
capacity as such, informed plaintiff that the cotton had arrived. Relying
on this assurance the plaintiff paid the draft. Held, defendant railway
company is liable for the amount so paid on the ground that the employee
had authority to notify persons in the position of plaintiff of the arrival
or nonarrival of merchandise. Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co.
(1929), 49 S. Ct. 160.
By the early English rule the carrier was not liable on bills of lading
issued by a servant when the goods had not been received, on the theory
that the servant had not acted within the scope of his authority. Berkley
v. Watling (1832), 7 A. & E. 29; Grant v. Norway (1852), 10 C. B. 665; Hub-
bersty v. Ward (1853), 8 Ex. 330. However, shortly after the leading case
of Grant v. Norway, supra, was decided the English Bills of Lading Act
(1855) made every bill of lading in the hands of a consignee or indorsee
for valuable consideration conclusive evidence of the shipment of such
goods as it represented, against the person signing it.
The Federal courts also held early that the taker assumes the risk of
the apparent authority of the servant to issue the bill of lading. Schooner
Freeman v. Buckinham et al. (1855), 18 How. 182. A line of cases held
that if no goods were actually delivered, the carrier could not be held liable.
Pollard v. Vinton (1881), 105 U. S. 7; Iron Mountain R. R. Co. v. Knight
(1887), 122 U. S. 79; Friedlander v. Texas and Pacific Railway Co. (1888),
130 U. S. 416; Missouri Pacific Railway v. McFadden (1894), 154 U. S.
155. Many of the state courts followed the same rule. Louisville & Nash-
ville Ry. Co. v. Nat. Park Bank (1914), 188 Ala. 109, 65 So. 1003; St. Louis
I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Citizens' Bank (1908), 87 Ark. 26, 112 S. W. 154.
Other state courts, however, held the carrier liable on the ground of estop-
pel. Bank of Batavia v. N. Y. L. E. & W. Ry. Co. (1887), 106 N. Y. 195,
12 N. E. 433; Brooke v. N. Y'. L. E. & W. Ry. Co. (1885), 108 Pa. 529, 1
Atl. 206; M. K & T. Ry. Co. v. Sealy et al. (1908), 78 Kan. 758, 99 Pac.
230. As a result of the desire to emerge from the hopeless conflict on this
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point the Federal Bills of Lading Act (39 Stat. 542, 44 U. S. C. 102) vir-
tually adopted, in section 22, the former minority view imposing liability on a
carrier whose agent issued a bill of lading without all or any part of the
goods having been delivered to it. The Uniform State Bills of Lading
Act, similar on this point to the Federal act, has been adopted by the fol-
lowing states: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,
Alaska, and the Philippine Islands.
The Federal court below found for the carrier, arguing that the Bills of
Lading Act did not cover a situation in which the employee's act was en-
tirely in furtherance of selfish motives. Seaboard Air Line R. v. Gleason
(C. C. A. 5, 1927), 21 F. (2d) 883. The Supreme Court, however, notes
no difference between this situation and the one in which the employee's
default is actuated by other sinister motives or by negligence. This view
represents the general weight of authority. Planters' Rice-Mill Co. V.
Merchants' Nat. Bank (1887), 78 Ga. 574, 3 S. E. 327; MeCord v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. (1888), 39 Minn. 181; Lloyd v. Grace (1912), A. C.
716, 5 B. R. C. 498. The Supreme Court does not base liability on the ap-
parent or implied authority of the agent to issue the bill of lading, for he
had no such authority. The forgery was entirely outside the master's
business. The carrier is held liable on the apparent authority of the agent
to tell plaintiff whether or not the goods had arrived. But section 22 of
the Bills of Lading Act applies to the carrier whose agent had the actual
or apparent authority to issue the bill. This decision expands the rule as
laid down in the Bills of Lading Act to take in a new and slightly differ-
ent situation. B. L. W., '31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAw-C1MzPULSORY EDUCATION
STATUTES.-Complaints were filed by the State of New Hampshire against
the named defendant and others, charging in each case a failure to cause a
child of defendant to attend public or approved private schools, as required
by Public Laws 1926, c. 118, secs. 1, 2. The defense was that in each case
the child was being taught by a private tutor in his own home in the studies
required to be taught in the public schools to one of his age. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held the statute not unconstitutional as against
the guaranty of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. State v. Hoyt (N. H. 1929), 146 Atl. 170.
The constitutionality of general compulsory education statutes, requiring
children between certain specified ages to attend schools, has been affirma-
tively determined. 35 Cyc. 1122; 24 R. C. L. 621; Ann. Cas. 1912A, 373;
State v. Bailey (1901), 157 Ind. 324, 61 N. E. 730; State v. Jackson (1902),
71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021. Likewise, compulsory vaccination statutes have
been rather universally upheld, as have statutes penalizing parents and
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